Latin America, West Africa and Lebanon in the Joumaa and LCB cases
The Latin America–West Africa–Lebanon connection in the Ayman Joumaa and Lebanese Canadian Bank (LCB) records involves several flows that should not be collapsed into a single shipment route. DEA said a network moved drugs from South America toward Europe and the Middle East via West Africa. In a separate civil case, the U.S. Department of Justice alleged that funds moved through Lebanese financial institutions to buy U.S. used cars, which were shipped to West Africa; car-sale receipts and narcotics proceeds then moved into Lebanon through channels it described as controlled by Hezbollah. LCB settled specified civil claims in 2013.[1][2]
Drug routes
DEA’s 2011 account described South American-origin drugs traveling via West Africa toward Europe and the Middle East and said the Joumaa network laundered proceeds through LCB, exchange houses, bulk cash and trade. This is an agency account of an investigated network, not a finding that every leg of a specific shipment passed through every named node.[1][2][3]
Vehicle-purchase wires
According to the amended civil complaint summarized by DOJ, at least $329 million was wired from LCB and other institutions to the United States from roughly January 2007 to early 2011 for used-car purchases. The cars went to West Africa. DOJ said cash from sales was combined with narcotics proceeds and funneled to Lebanon through Hezbollah-controlled money-laundering channels. The $329 million measures car-purchase wires, not an amount adjudicated as Hezbollah drug revenue.[1][2][3]
Civil settlement
The 2013 order required LCB to forfeit $102 million and resolved civil claims relating to LCB and its assets; the action continued against other alleged participants. A settlement of claims against a bank is not a conviction of every person, car dealer or exchange named in the complaint. Drug movement, trade payments and alleged receipt by a beneficiary are distinct relationships.[1][2][3]
Named West African services
The earlier civil complaint announcement named Oussama Salhab, described as an alleged Hezbollah operative in Togo, as controller of couriers moving cash from Benin through Togo and Ghana to Lebanon. It identified Cybamar, a Michigan-based car shipper owned or controlled by Salhab and relatives, as a business frequently used for vehicles bound for West Africa. The announcement also described a separate West African narcotics organization led by Maroun Saade; each named actor sits on a particular alleged service edge, and the complaint warned that these assertions were accusations.[1][2][3]
The financial circuit
The amended complaint filed in October 2012 separated several stages. Bank accounts in Lebanon financed purchases in the United States. Buyers acquired vehicles, often at auctions, and arranged their movement to shipping ports. Vehicles were exported to West Africa and sold, commonly for local currency. Proceeds were then converted into dollars or euros and moved toward Lebanon, allegedly alongside money from narcotics trafficking and other crimes. This sequence explains why the government examined both normal commercial documentation and cash-courier activity. The cars and the money did not move in identical directions, and the allegation did not require every vehicle to contain concealed drugs.[4][5]
Exchange houses and other originators
The government divided the transfers into $203,269,615 originating from Hassan Ayash Exchange and Ellissa Exchange and $126,281,969 from other account holders. Within the exchange-house figure, approximately $141.5 million came from Ayash and $61.7 million from Ellissa. This is a second classification of the same overall payment pool, by originator rather than by bank. It should not be added to the bank totals. The distinction nevertheless matters because the exchange businesses allegedly collected and transmitted funds for customers, while other originators used different commercial names. Identifying a sending bank alone did not identify every customer, beneficial owner or purpose behind the payment.[4]
The cash-return stage
Cars sold in West Africa typically generated local currency, according to the complaint. The government alleged that conversion into dollars or euros brought these receipts into contact with drug-derived foreign currency through black-market exchanges. The return stage included courier routes through Togo and Ghana and flights toward Beirut. These were alleged movements of cash after the sale and exchange stages, rather than a direct bank transfer back from every purchaser. The mechanism is important because sale proceeds could provide a commercial explanation for the movement of currency whose earlier source was different. Full tracing would require the particular sales, exchanges and recipients, not merely a map of the route.[4][5]
Blocked vehicles and interrupted payments
American prosecutors announced a $102 million settlement with LCB in June 2013. The settlement resolved specified civil claims against the bank. That figure is neither the total of the purchase wires nor an amount shown to have reached Hezbollah. The bank had also undergone an asset-and-liability transfer to Société Générale de Banque au Liban. In 2015, FinCEN withdrew the proposed special measure against LCB following the bank’s changed circumstances, including its cessation of banking operations. These developments establish important institutional outcomes, but do not supply a criminal verdict against every vehicle buyer or exchange-house employee named in the earlier investigation.[6][7][4]
Settlement positions and limits
The written LCB settlement records the bank’s assertion that it had no knowledge or reason to know of the alleged unlawful activity before the February 2011 finding. It also records LCB’s denial of wrongdoing and management involvement in drugs, terrorism or money laundering, and says it settled to end the litigation and facilitate the asset sale. SGBL asserted that it was an innocent purchaser and that the transaction had Lebanese central-bank approval. These positions qualify the civil outcome without converting it into a judgment on every underlying transaction.[8]
DOJ’s June 2013 announcement also described a separate settlement exceeding $720,000 with Hassan Ayash Exchange and said claims involving other alleged participants continued. That exchange settlement is distinct from the bank’s $102 million forfeiture and from the approximately $700,000 described as blocked in the complaint. The figures refer to different legal or financial stages and do not measure the full trade route’s proceeds.[9][4]
Later exchange-house findings
Treasury’s April 2013 account described at least $25 million in Rmeiti payments to U.S. dealers and exporters associated with Joumaa between 2008 and March 2011. It separately described more than $4 million in transfers arranged through Halawi in early 2012 and a plan involving $224 million in shipping contracts through a Benin car lot. The planned contracts were not reported as completed transfers. The earlier Rmeiti period also overlaps the LCB table’s period; adding these numbers would not yield a reliable cumulative total.[10][11]
Contemporary Daily Star reporting said Rmeiti rejected the accusation and challenged the evidence. Halawi said it followed Lebanese requirements and retained client and source-of-funds documentation. These institutional responses are part of the history of the later findings; the agency accounts did not amount to criminal judgments resolving every allegation against the businesses.[12]
Understanding the financial mechanism
Noam Binstok, Orna Mizrahi and Esteban Klor’s May 2026 INSS analysis describes trade and informal transfers as complementary parts of decentralized financial networks, including settlement through offsets. It helps explain the distinction between buying and transporting goods and settling a financial obligation elsewhere. The physical courier movements and named-company transactions in the LCB complaint remain specific allegations; the general mechanism does not establish the source or destination of every used-car payment.[13]
See also
References
- ↑ 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 Inherited reference: https://www.dea.gov/es/node/5173
- ↑ 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 Inherited reference: https://www.justice.gov/archive/usao/nys/pressreleases/June13/LCBSettlementPR.php
- ↑ 3.0 3.1 3.2 3.3 Inherited reference: https://www.justice.gov/archive/usao/nys/pressreleases/December11/hizballahmoneylaunderingpr.pdf
- ↑ 4.0 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 VERIFIED AMENDED COMPLAINT — 11 Civ. 9186 (PAE)
- ↑ 5.0 5.1 Treasury Identifies Lebanese Canadian Bank Sal as a “Primary Money Laundering Concern” | U.S. Department of the Treasury
- ↑ Inherited reference: https://www.fincen.gov/system/files/shared/2015-24912.pdf
- ↑ Federal Register :: Notice of Finding That Kassem Rmeiti & Co. For Exchange Is a Financial Institution of Primary Money Laundering Concern
- ↑ LCB and SGBL settlement order,2013
- ↑ Southern District of New York | Manhattan U.S. Attorney Announces $102 Million Settlement Of Civil Forfeiture And Money Laundering Claims Against Lebanese Canadian Bank | United States Department of Justice
- ↑ Treasury Identifies Kassem Rmeiti & Co. for Exchange and Halawi Exchange Co. as Financial Institutions of “Primary Money Laundering Concern” | U.S. Department of the Treasury
- ↑ Federal Register :: Notice of Finding That Halawi Exchange Co. Is a Financial Institution of Primary Money Laundering Concern
- ↑ Inherited reference: https://www.albawaba.com/business/lebanon-money-changer-487228
- ↑ Hezbollah’s Global Financial Network as a Target in the War Against the Organization
Legal and sanctions status as of 20 October 2026.