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Ellissa Holding

From TerrorWiki
Editorial illustration: Ellissa Holding
Original editorial illustration of a corporate parent-subsidiary structure and used-car lot; no individual transaction is depicted.

Ellissa Holding was a holding company designated in the U.S. Treasury’s January 2011 action against Ayman Joumaa’s drug-trafficking and money-laundering organization. Treasury said Ali Mohammed Kharroubi owned it and that it controlled nine companies in Lebanon, Benin and the Democratic Republic of Congo. It specifically named Ellissa Group SA as a Benin subsidiary involved in used-car sales in Africa. These corporate links place the companies in a designated network but do not, by themselves, identify each car sale as a drug-money transaction.[1]

Identity and network record

Treasury identified Ellissa Holding as designated, its owner as Ali Mohammed Kharroubi, and Ellissa Group SA as its subsidiary in Benin. It also designated Ellissa Exchange Company, one of the Lebanese exchanges used by Joumaa’s organization. The release does not list the individual role of every subsidiary or establish that all nine subsidiaries acted as exchange houses.[1]

Ellissa Group SA’s described business was selling used cars in Africa. A later Treasury action described a wider Joumaa-linked pattern in which U.S.-purchased used vehicles were shipped to West Africa and proceeds moved through exchange houses, including Halawi and Rmeiti after earlier disruptions. These accounts show why the car business matters to the network map. The 2013 description of Halawi cash shipments cannot automatically be assigned to Ellissa Group SA.[1][2]

In the December 2011 civil complaint account, DOJ said vehicles purchased through the wider Lebanese bank-and-exchange network were shipped mainly to Cotonou, where a car park owned by Ellissa Group, a subsidiary of Ellissa Holding, sold them. DOJ alleged that some cash proceeds moved back through Hezbollah-controlled courier channels. A named car park and a pleaded route establish a more specific role than the holding-company designation alone, while the government’s aggregate $329 million wire figure cannot be assigned entirely to Ellissa.[3]

The 2013 Treasury action stated the agency believed Hezbollah replaced designated Ellissa owner Kharroubi with Haitham Rmeiti as a key funds-transfer facilitator. That is a person-level assessment; the cited releases do not provide an Ellissa Group SA payment to Hezbollah. Ownership, designation, business activity and the separately attributed facilitator assessment describe different relationships; they do not establish one traced payment.[2]

Corporate functions

The amended complaint located Ellissa Exchange in Sarafand, Lebanon; Ellissa Group SA’s car park in Cotonou, Benin; and Ellissa Shipping’s activity in carrying used cars through Cotonou port. It identified Jamal Mohamad Kharoubi and Ali Mohammed Kharroubi as principal owners and controllers of the holding company. This account separates the parent, exchange, vehicle-sales subsidiary and shipping operation.[4]

The civil allegations

Paragraph 35 of the amended complaint alleged that Ellissa Holding and its affiliates, alongside other named participants, supplied funds, goods or services for Hezbollah’s benefit. It described fees and commissions paid to members and supporters involved at stages of the used-car and money-transfer scheme. This was a broader pleaded allegation than the Treasury release’s corporate list. It was not a judgment or a quantified, individually traced payment from Ellissa Group SA to Hezbollah.[4]

Separate transfer populations

The complaint attributed $61,747,524 in car-related wires to Ellissa Exchange during January 2007–January 2011. Its ARZ Export example separately listed $1,327,474 from Ellissa Group in 23 wires, $215,446 from the exchange in four wires, and $84,968 from Ali Kharoubi in one wire. These rows distinguish the senders; the exchange-wide amount and particular buyer examples are not additional sums to combine into a new estimate for the holding company.[4]

Requested relief

The complaint sought civil money-laundering penalties of no less than $61,747,524 from Ellissa Holding, including Ellissa Exchange. The amount reflects the government’s requested relief and alleged transaction population. It does not establish that a court awarded that sum, that the company paid it, or that it represented a measured benefit to Hezbollah.[4]

Blocked vehicles

An asset schedule separately listed approximately 350 cars consigned to Ellissa Holding at locations in the United States as blocked under its January 2011 designation. Those vehicles were a distinct asset category from the exchange’s wire-transfer totals. Their listing did not report a completed forfeiture, a sale price or a criminal verdict against the holding company.[4]

Responses and separate outcomes

Contemporary reporting carried denials from the exchange houses targeted in 2013. Halawi said it complied with Lebanese requirements and maintained client and source-of-funds documents, while Rmeiti rejected the accusation and challenged the evidence. These responses qualify the agencies’ account of the replacement financial channels; they are not admissions by the Ellissa businesses or Kharroubi.[5]

LCB’s related case ended in a $102 million civil forfeiture, with the bank’s denial preserved in the agreement. The bank’s settlement and Hassan Ayash Exchange’s separate resolution did not settle every allegation against other participants. Treasury’s broader assessment that the Joumaa network benefited Hezbollah does not establish that every exchange-house payment was Hezbollah’s money.[6][7][8]

Research interpretation

Noam Binstok, Orna Mizrahi and Esteban Klor’s May 2026 INSS analysis describes trade, currency exchange and informal settlement as interacting mechanisms. The model helps explain why ownership, commercial sales and financial intermediaries appear together in the Ellissa records. It does not allocate every company payment to its owner, establish the origin of every sale or determine the amount ultimately received by Hezbollah.[9]

See also

References

Legal and sanctions status as of 4 October 2026.

TerrorWiki: Hezbollah-linked narcotics finance and illicit-finance networks
Hezbollah Funding of Hezbollah · Hezbollah · Hezbollah-linked narcotics finance
People Abbas Hussein Harb · Adel El Zabayar · Akram Saied Joumaa · Ali Mohamad Saleh · Ali Mohammed Kharroubi · Amer Mohamed Akil Rada · Ayman Joumaa · Chekri Mahmoud Harb · Dino Bouterse · Haitham Rmeiti · Hamdi Zaher El Dine · Hassan Ayash · Hassan Muhammad Daqqou · Henry Guberek Grimberg · Ibrahim Chibli · Iman Kobeissi · Isaac Perez Guberek Ravinovicz · Johanna Patricia Ceballos Bueno · Joseph Asmar · Kassem Chams · Khaldoun Hamieh · Luis Santiago Calle Quiros · Maria Paloma Rodriguez Badillo · Merhi Ali Abou Merhi · Mohamad Noureddine · Mohammad Ibrahim Bazzi · Noah Zaitar · Raji Falhout · Samer Akil Rada · Samer Kamal al-Assad · Siavosh Henareh
Organizations and networks Ayman Joumaa network · Barakat network · Chams Money Laundering Organization · Cheaitelly–El Khansa network · Guberek money-laundering network · Guberek network Spanish cell · Hezbollah Business Affairs Component
Banks and exchange houses Al-Qard al-Hasan · Ellissa Exchange Company · Halawi Exchange · Hassan Ayash Exchange Company · Kassem Rmeiti & Co. for Exchange · Lebanese Canadian Bank
Companies Abou Merhi Group · Abou-Merhi Lines · Caesar's Park Hotel · Ellissa Holding · Trade Point International
Criminal groups Cártel de los Soles in the El Zabayar case · FARC in the El Zabayar case · La Oficina de Envigado · Los Zetas in the Ayman Joumaa case · Sinaloa Cartel in the 2019 Chams designation
Investigations and operations Hezbollah Financing and Narcoterrorism Team · Operation Cedar · Operation Titan · Project Cassandra
Countries and regions Argentina and Triple Frontier financial investigations · Benin in the Joumaa exchange-house records · Colón Free Zone money laundering · Hezbollah finance in Brazil · Hezbollah finance in Paraguay · Hezbollah finance in the Triple Frontier · Hezbollah-linked narcotics finance in Colombia · Hezbollah-linked narcotics finance in Latin America · Latin America, West Africa and Lebanon in the Joumaa and LCB cases · South America, Europe and Lebanon in the 2016 DEA investigation · Transnational narcotics finance in Lebanon · Venezuela in the El Zabayar case · West Africa in the Lebanese Canadian Bank case
Money-laundering methods Black Market Peso Exchange · Bulk-cash movement in the Joumaa and LCB cases · Cocaine-proceeds laundering · Exchange houses in narcotics finance · Hawala disbursement in the 2016 European drug-money investigation · Professional money-laundering services · Shell-company accounts in the Guberek network · Trade-based money laundering · U.S. used-car exports to West Africa
Sanctions and law 2013 Section 311 action on Rmeiti and Halawi exchanges · Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act · Hizballah International Financing Prevention Act · Narcoterrorism · Section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act
Captagon trade Captagon trafficking and Hezbollah · Syrian Fourth Division and Captagon