Haitham Rmeiti

Haitham Rmeiti was identified by U.S. Treasury in 2013 as the manager and owner of STE Rmeiti. Treasury said it believed Hezbollah had replaced U.S.-designated Ellissa Exchange owner Ali Kharroubi with Haitham Rmeiti as a key facilitator for wiring and transferring Hezbollah funds. It also said that Kassem Rmeiti & Co. for Exchange owned STE Rmeiti through its owner. The statement concerns Treasury’s assessment of a financial facilitator; it does not specify an individual cocaine transaction by Haitham or STE Rmeiti.

Place in the exchange network

In April 2013 Treasury named Kassem Rmeiti & Co. for Exchange and Halawi Exchange as institutions of primary money-laundering concern under Section 311. It described payments by Rmeiti Exchange to U.S. car dealers associated with the Joumaa network and other transfers on behalf of money launderers, traffickers and suspected Hezbollah affiliates. STE Rmeiti is identified as a company owned by Rmeiti Exchange through its owner, with Haitham as manager and owner. The statement does not attribute each Rmeiti Exchange transaction to Haitham personally.

FinCEN’s April 2013 finding identifies Societe Rmaiti SARL as another name for STE Rmeiti. It defines Rmeiti Exchange to include related companies, including Rmaiti Group SAL, and describes associated operations in Switzerland and Benin. Within that corporate account, it names Kassem Rmeiti as the exchange’s owner and Haitham as STE Rmeiti’s manager and owner. Those descriptions distinguish the two men’s roles; they do not provide a shareholding breakdown or justify treating their names as interchangeable.

The December 2011 assessment

Treasury explicitly framed the replacement as its belief as of December 2011: Hezbollah had moved from designated Ellissa owner Ali Kharroubi to Haitham Rmeiti as a funds-transfer facilitator. That is stronger than a connection inferred solely from family name or shared geography, but it remains a public agency assessment. It provides no ledger establishing amount, source or destination of particular transfers by Haitham.

Chronology and payment totals

Treasury placed the claimed facilitator replacement as of December 2011, after the 2011 designations of Ellissa Exchange and the Lebanese Canadian Bank action. It described Rmeiti Exchange as paying at least $25 million to U.S. car dealers associated with the Joumaa network between 2008 and March 2011, then described at least $1.7 million moved for Beninese and Lebanese launderers from March 2011 to October 2012. Those amounts belong to the exchange and its owner in Treasury’s account; the release did not attribute either total personally to Haitham or identify STE Rmeiti as the account receiving the stated payments.

The detailed finding gives an overview of more than $27 million in car-related transfers during 2008–2011, while the agency announcement specifies at least $25 million between 2008 and March 2011. FinCEN says more than $22 million of the latter moved through accounts at Lebanese Canadian Bank. The different periods and the included bank subset should remain separate; adding them would double-count activity, and none is presented as Haitham’s personal income.

FinCEN separately alleged that TAG was established in Benin in February 2011 at Ali Mohamed Kharroubi’s direction and that former Ellissa personnel continued related activity. Its $1.7 million figure for TAG during March–October 2011 differs from the $1.7 million described for Rmeiti clients during March 2011–October 2012. The similar amounts do not establish identical transactions. Neither establishes an amount wired by Haitham or received by STE Rmeiti.

The finding also says Kassem Rmeiti sought help in April 2012 to begin selling African gold in Lebanon or Dubai. It describes a proposed expansion of the exchange owner’s business and the agency’s concern about future commingling. This is distinct from its December 2011 assessment of Haitham’s funds-transfer role. The proposal does not establish that Haitham executed a gold shipment or that the planned business produced a particular amount of narcotics revenue.

Narcotics and financial relationships

The same Treasury action described Rmeiti Exchange as processing payments for Joumaa-linked car dealers and moving money for traffickers. Separately, it identified a Hezbollah-funds facilitation role for Haitham. The overlap explains his relevance to the exchange-house network, but the public account does not say a specific Joumaa cocaine payment passed through STE Rmeiti or that all of its activity financed Hezbollah.

Regulatory action and response

The April 2013 announcement paired the findings with an immediately effective, 120-day reporting order for new or attempted transactions involving Rmeiti and Halawi. It also announced proposed restrictions on correspondent and payable-through accounts. The temporary order and proposed rule were different measures; the announcement was not a criminal judgment against Haitham or STE Rmeiti.

Contemporary Daily Star reporting said Rmeiti rejected the accusation and challenged the evidence. Halawi, named in the same action, said it complied with Lebanese requirements and retained client and source-of-funds documentation. These responses concern the respective businesses. They should not be converted into a separately documented personal statement by Haitham.

Financial mechanisms

Noam Binstok, Orna Mizrahi and Esteban Klor’s May 2026 INSS analysis describes decentralized exchange networks, hawala offsets and trade settlement. It helps explain how financial services can be redistributed among intermediaries after disruption of a bank or exchange. That general mechanism provides context for Treasury’s replacement assessment; it does not independently identify a transfer by Haitham, establish its source, or quantify funds delivered to Hezbollah.

See also

• Hezbollah Business Affairs Component
• Lebanese Canadian Bank

References

Legal and sanctions status as of 20 September 2026.