Luis Santiago Calle Quiros
Luis Santiago Calle Quiros was designated by U.S. Treasury under the Kingpin Act in October 2013. Treasury described him and Maria Paloma Rodriguez Badillo as longtime partners of Isaac Perez Guberek Ravinovicz who collected European narcotics-sale cash in Madrid and moved funds to Guberek-controlled accounts for payment to traffickers in Colombia. Treasury also designated five companies in Spain and Peru as owned or controlled by Calle Quiros. The action identifies a cell of a network that served Ayman Joumaa among other clients; it does not establish a Calle Quiros-to-Hezbollah transfer. OFAC removed Calle Quiros on 14 June 2017.[1][2][3]
Role in the network
Treasury said Calle Quiros and Rodriguez Badillo coordinated with Guberek Ravinovicz, collecting cash at Madrid offices and funneling money to accounts he controlled. The agency designated two companies in Spain and three in Peru because it said Calle Quiros owned or controlled them. It did not state that every transaction of those companies involved drug proceeds or identify the proceeds of a specific Joumaa shipment in the Madrid collection.[1]
Named companies
The five companies were Textimax Spain S.L. and Castizal Madrilena S.L. in Madrid, and Cartronic Group Peru S.A.C., Inmobiliaria Castizal S.A.C. and Ucalsa Peru S.A. in Lima. The Madrid companies shared the published street address Calle Julian Camarillo 47, with a unit specified for Castizal. The entries identify the businesses Treasury associated with Calle Quiros; they do not identify every company address as a proven cash handover site.[4]
Other named relationships
Treasury placed two Calle Quiros-controlled designated companies in Madrid and three in Lima, while locating the described cash collection at Madrid offices. His dual Spanish and Peruvian nationality and the companies’ two-country footprint do not show that each of those firms held a specified Joumaa deposit.[1]
Legal record and attribution
Treasury described the Madrid operation as working under Guberek Ravinovicz’s direction. Its July action had already named Joumaa and Linares Castillo as clients of the Bogota-based network. This is a documented hierarchy and a network-level client relationship. The Spanish-cell release does not identify which share of Madrid cash came from either named client.[1][2]
Removal from the sanctions list
OFAC removed Calle Quiros on 14 June 2017, along with Textimax Spain, Castizal Madrilena, Inmobiliaria Castizal and Ucalsa Peru. Cartronic had been removed on 28 April 2015, and Rodriguez Badillo on 29 September 2016. The April 2015 action amended Calle Quiros’s company links but did not remove him personally. These notices record different dates and outcomes without giving an individual-case explanation for each removal.[3][5][6]
Reported Peruvian finding
An update to El Colombiano’s report states that a July 2018 determination by Peru’s Ministerio Público found insufficient evidence to support suspicion of drug-proceeds laundering involving Calle Quiros. It also reported that no indications had been found of a profit-generating predicate offense. This is the newspaper’s account of a prosecutorial determination. It materially qualifies the earlier allegations, while remaining distinct from the OFAC removal and from a reported criminal acquittal after trial.[7]
Related network and scope
The cited October 2013 action was an administrative sanctions designation, not a criminal judgment. The available Treasury releases establish what OFAC alleged about Calle Quiros’s role and companies. The separate statement that Joumaa’s enterprise benefited Hezbollah should not be transferred to Calle Quiros personally without a source identifying such a payment or affiliation.[1][2]
Interpretations and the limits of the client link
Matthew Levitt’s Beyond Convergence chapter describes the Madrid collections as including Joumaa’s proceeds. Treasury’s October release identified Joumaa as a client of the wider Guberek network without assigning a specific Madrid collection to him. The stronger description belongs to Levitt’s interpretation. Neither account publishes a personal Calle Quiros payment to Hezbollah.[8][1]
Financial mechanism and individual scope
Noam Binstok, Orna Mizrahi and Esteban Klor’s May 2026 INSS analysis describes trade, exchange businesses and hawala offsets as complementary means of financial settlement. It provides context for the distinction between collecting cash in Madrid and making value available in Colombia. The model does not identify an additional personal transfer, establish knowledge of a specific payment’s criminal source, or quantify a receipt by Hezbollah.[9]
See also
References
- ↑ 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 Treasury, Spanish cell designation, 29 October 2013
- ↑ 2.0 2.1 2.2 Treasury, Guberek network designation, 9 July 2013
- ↑ 3.0 3.1 OFAC, Counter Narcotics Designations Removals and Updates, 14 June 2017
- ↑ OFAC, Kingpin Act Designations, 29 October 2013
- ↑ OFAC, Counter Terrorism Designations; Counter Narcotics Designations Removals, 28 April 2015
- ↑ OFAC, Kingpin Act Designations; Counter Narcotics Designations Removals, 29 September 2016
- ↑ El Colombiano, 29 October 2013 article with later update on July 2018 Peruvian determination
- ↑ Beyond Covergence: World Without Order
- ↑ Hezbollah’s Global Financial Network as a Target in the War Against the Organization
Legal and sanctions status as of 7 September 2026.