Ellissa Exchange Company

Editorial illustration: Ellissa Exchange Company

Original editorial illustration of a generic exchange-house storefront and financial records; no company signage or transaction route is depicted.

Ellissa Exchange Company was one of three Lebanon-based money exchanges that U.S. Treasury designated in January 2011 as used by Ayman Joumaa’s organization to launder illicit proceeds. In a separate 2013 account, Treasury described its designated owner, Ali Kharroubi, as a former facilitator for Hezbollah funds transfers, an assertion made in the context of a later replacement by a Rmeiti-affiliated operator. The record establishes a named exchange-house link to the Joumaa organization and an attributed Hezbollah-facilitation assessment concerning the owner; it does not identify every Ellissa transaction as a Hezbollah payment.

Designation and network

The January 2011 OFAC action designated Ellissa Exchange Company, Hassan Ayash Exchange Company and New Line Exchange Trust Co. as money exchanges used by Joumaa’s organization. Treasury described that organization as trafficking cocaine and laundering its proceeds through several channels, including Lebanon-based exchange houses. The designation is a sanctions action; it does not itself establish a criminal conviction of Ellissa or every person associated with it.

Treasury also named Ali Mohammed Kharroubi among people targeted for roles in the exchanges. It said Kharroubi owned Ellissa Holding, a designated company that controlled nine companies across Lebanon, Benin and the Democratic Republic of Congo. One was Ellissa Group SA in Benin, involved in selling used cars in Africa. The release does not specify which individual car sales were illicit or that all nine subsidiaries laundered drug proceeds.

Corporate and banking relationships

The amended civil complaint described Ellissa Exchange as based in Sarafand, Lebanon. It distinguished that exchange from Ellissa Group SA’s car park in Cotonou, Benin, and Ellissa Shipping’s role in transporting used cars through Cotonou port. It named Jamal Mohamad Kharoubi and Ali Mohammed Kharroubi as principal owners and controllers of the holding company. The allegations describe linked financial, shipping and sales businesses with different functions.

According to the complaint, Hassan Ayash Exchange introduced Ellissa Exchange to Lebanese Canadian Bank, where the exchanges and their principals held accounts at the Verdun branch in Beirut. The complaint cited a 2006 customer-due-diligence report describing limited customer files, cash-smuggling concerns involving Africa and transactions inconsistent with the accounts’ stated purposes. It alleged that reporting and diligence remained inadequate after the bank’s anti-money-laundering committee directed Ahmad Safa to address the problems.

Designation and network

A December 2011 Justice Department account of a civil complaint named Ellissa Exchange among Lebanese institutions alleged to have wired funds for U.S. used cars. The complaint described at least $329 million in aggregate wires from several banks and exchanges from January 2007 to early 2011; that figure is not an Ellissa-only amount. It also alleged that Lebanese Canadian Bank allowed Ellissa companies large cash transactions without adequate disclosure of the money’s sources and purposes.

Exchange-specific amounts

The complaint attributed approximately $61,747,524 in wires for purchasing or shipping cars to Ellissa Exchange between January 2007 and January 2011. Together with approximately $141,522,091 attributed to Hassan Ayash Exchange, this formed the $203,269,615 exchange-originated subtotal. An additional $126,281,969 from other account holders brought the overall table to $329,551,584. These are nested totals, not separate sums to add together; the Ellissa amount was an alleged transaction flow, not a calculated Hezbollah receipt.

Examples of transfers

The complaint’s car-buyer table illustrates why the corporate distinctions matter. It listed six Ellissa Exchange wires totaling $374,454 to A & J Auto Sales in Lansing, Michigan. For ARZ Export in Columbia, Maryland, it separately listed four Ellissa Exchange wires totaling $215,446, 23 Ellissa Group wires totaling $1,327,474, and one $84,968 wire attributed to Ali Kharoubi. These entries are examples within the case’s transfer population and should not be added to the overall totals as new proceeds.

Designation and network

In its 2013 action concerning Rmeiti and Halawi exchanges, Treasury stated that it believed Hezbollah had replaced U.S.-designated Ellissa owner Ali Kharroubi with Haitham Rmeiti as a key facilitator for wiring and transferring Hezbollah funds. This is Treasury’s stated belief about individuals and a change in facilitation, not a transaction list showing that all Ellissa Exchange funds reached Hezbollah. The 2013 action also referenced Ellissa in connection with the Joumaa and Lebanese Canadian Bank civil case.

Adaptation after designation

FinCEN’s April 2013 Rmeiti finding alleged that Kharroubi directed Kassem Rmeiti to establish Trading African Group, or TAG, in Benin in February 2011 so that payments for U.S. cars could continue with less scrutiny. It said former Ellissa employees worked for TAG by autumn 2011 and that Rmeiti paid Kharroubi about 30–40 percent of TAG’s profits. That percentage describes the alleged share paid to Kharroubi; the finding does not identify it as Hezbollah’s share.

The same finding attributed more than $1.7 million in payments to U.S. car dealers and exporters to TAG between March and October 2011. It described later use of World Car Service accounts as another shift in transaction channels. Separately, it dated the alleged replacement of Kharroubi by Haitham Rmeiti as a facilitator of Hezbollah funds to December 2011. The personnel, company and facilitation allegations are related, but they do not establish that every transaction in the replacement businesses was an Ellissa payment.

Responses and separate outcomes

Contemporary reporting carried denials from the exchange houses targeted in 2013. Halawi said it complied with Lebanese requirements and retained client and source-of-funds documentation; Rmeiti challenged the evidence and rejected the accusation. Those responses belong alongside the agencies’ adaptation account and do not constitute an Ellissa admission.

The related Lebanese Canadian Bank case ended in a $102 million civil forfeiture, with the bank’s denial preserved in the settlement agreement. That resolution concerns the bank and should not be described as an Ellissa criminal conviction. The Treasury network-benefit allegation likewise does not identify every exchange-house transfer as Hezbollah’s money.

Asset restrictions

The complaint’s asset schedule listed approximately 350 cars consigned to Ellissa Holding at U.S. locations as blocked under the January 2011 designation. This was an asset description involving the holding company, separate from the exchange’s wire-transfer totals. It was not a statement that a court had completed forfeiture of those cars or that their value equaled the exchange’s alleged proceeds.

Research interpretation

Noam Binstok, Orna Mizrahi and Esteban Klor’s May 2026 INSS analysis describes the interaction of commercial payments, money-changing and informal settlement in decentralized networks. That framework helps explain why an exchange house, a car importer and a shipping business may appear together in a financial investigation. In Ellissa’s case, the specific amounts and relationships come from the cited agency and civil-complaint accounts; the later model does not establish that every company transaction used the same method.

See also

• Hezbollah Business Affairs Component
• Lebanese Canadian Bank

References

Legal and sanctions status as of 1 September 2026.