Abbas Hussein Harb

Abbas Hussein Harb was designated under the Kingpin Act in June 2012. U.S. Treasury said his Colombia- and Venezuela-based organization laundered money for Ayman Joumaa through the Lebanese financial sector and that, in 2010, Joumaa moved more than $1 million into an account owned by Harb and managed by Ibrahim Chibli. The release described the broader Joumaa network as benefiting Hezbollah but did not identify that specific deposit as a Hezbollah payment.

Designation, account and network

Treasury designated Harb and Chibli for collaborating with Joumaa in moving millions of dollars of narcotics-related proceeds. The release singled out an account owned by Harb and managed by Chibli that received more than $1 million from Joumaa in 2010. These statements are an OFAC assessment, not a cited criminal judgment.

Banking relationship

Treasury identified Chibli as the manager of Fenicia Bank’s Abbassieh branch in Lebanon and alleged that he used that position to facilitate transfers for Joumaa and Harb. This gives the account transaction a specific institutional setting: Harb owned the receiving account, while Chibli managed it through his banking role. The announcement did not say that the entire sum was a laundering commission or that the bank itself was one of the entities designated in this action.

Designation, account and network

The agency placed Harb’s laundering organization in Colombia and Venezuela and the financial channel in Lebanon. It designated Harb’s brother Ali Houssein Harb and Kassem Mohamad Saleh for network links, with named firms in Colombia and Venezuela. Those related designations establish a network map, not that each person performed Harb’s account transaction.

Treasury named three trade entities in the same June 2012 action: Importadora Silvania and Bodega Michigan in Colombia, and Importadora Silvania, C.A. in Venezuela. It described them as owned or controlled by Harb and/or Kassem Mohamad Saleh, without assigning the 2010 million-dollar account transfer to any one of those firms. The named entities show the network’s geographic and corporate footprint rather than a documented Hezbollah remittance by Harb.

Treasury identified Harb as a dual Venezuelan and Lebanese citizen, while identifying Chibli as Lebanese. In the same action it separately designated Ali Mohamad Saleh under a terrorism authority for a Maicao fundraising role; that finding should not be assigned to Harb merely because the names share one release.

Exchange-house connection

In its April 2013 finding concerning Halawi Exchange, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, or FinCEN, alleged that Harb and Ibrahim Chebli regularly coordinated and executed transactions, including bulk-cash transfers, processed through the exchange house. The finding used the Chebli spelling for the banker described in the 2012 Chibli designation. This account adds an exchange-house channel to the bank-account relationship; it does not assign a separate total to Harb’s Halawi transactions.

Contemporary reporting carried Halawi’s denial of the allegations and its assertion that it complied with Lebanese requirements and retained client and source-of-funds records. Rmeiti, another exchange house targeted at the same time, also challenged the evidence and rejected the accusation. Those responses qualify the agencies’ accounts; they do not amount to a judgment resolving Harb’s individual conduct.

What the amounts describe

The June 2012 announcement placed the Harb action after Joumaa’s January 2011 designation and November 2011 indictment. It repeated an estimate of up to $200 million per month for Joumaa’s organization across multiple channels. That network-wide estimate is distinct from the particular transfer of more than $1 million into Harb’s account in 2010. Neither amount, by itself, measures Harb’s personal income or a payment received by Hezbollah.

Sanctions consequences

The June 2012 action prohibited U.S. persons from conducting financial or commercial transactions with the designated people and firms and froze covered assets under U.S. jurisdiction. Treasury said it coordinated the action with the Drug Enforcement Administration. These were the announced consequences of the designation; the release’s general discussion of penalties for sanctions violations was not a prison sentence imposed on Harb.

Designation, account and network

Treasury characterized the Joumaa money-laundering ring as benefiting criminals and Hezbollah. Its Harb paragraph concerns narcotics-related proceeds and an account movement; it does not say Harb personally transferred the 2010 deposit to Hezbollah. The specific account allegation and the broader network-benefit allegation have different scopes.

Research interpretation

Sami Kronenfeld and Yoel Guzansky’s September 2013 INSS analysis treats Latin American criminal relationships as sources of revenue and logistical access for Hezbollah and places them within a wider discussion of Iran’s regional relationships. The essay cites the June 2012 Treasury action. Its broader interpretation helps explain why the network attracted security attention, but it does not establish Iranian direction of Harb’s account transfer or identify that deposit as a Hezbollah remittance.

See also

• Hezbollah Business Affairs Component
• Lebanese Canadian Bank

References

Legal and sanctions status as of 23 September 2026.