Ayman Joumaa - Revision history

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	== Colombian intermediary ==		== Colombian intermediary ==

	In July 2014, Treasury described Pedro Claver Mejia Salazar as a launderer for [[La Oficina de Envigado]] who worked closely with Joumaa under the direction of a La Oficina underboss. According to the agency, La Oficina operatives used Joumaa's international channels to return proceeds to Colombian traffickers. Mejia subsequently had his own criminal outcome in Boston, reported by the Justice Department in September 2017. His proceeding was separate from Joumaa's: a plea by one intermediary did not determine the responsibility of other people named in sanctions announcements.<ref name="r51" /><ref name="r52" />		In July 2014, Treasury described [[Pedro Claver Mejia Salazar]] as a launderer for [[La Oficina de Envigado]] who worked closely with Joumaa under the direction of a La Oficina underboss. According to the agency, La Oficina operatives used Joumaa's international channels to return proceeds to Colombian traffickers. Mejia subsequently had his own criminal outcome in Boston, reported by the Justice Department in September 2017. His proceeding was separate from Joumaa's: a plea by one intermediary did not determine the responsibility of other people named in sanctions announcements.<ref name="r51" /><ref name="r52" />

	== References ==		== References ==

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	== Later financial relationships and adaptation ==		== Later financial relationships and adaptation ==

	Treasury alleged in April 2013 that the network had shifted laundering work to Rmeiti and Halawi exchange houses after the action against [[Lebanese Canadian Bank\|LCB]]. It described continued use of U.S. car dealerships and Asian consumer-goods transactions. FinCEN's individual findings discussed Halawi's earlier payments to American used-car companies and Rmeiti's transactions involving Ali Mohamed Kharroubi and Ellissa.<ref name="r39" /><ref name="r40" /><ref name="r41" />		Treasury alleged in April 2013 that the network had shifted laundering work to Rmeiti and Halawi exchange houses after the action against [[Lebanese Canadian Bank\|LCB]]. It described continued use of U.S. car dealerships and Asian consumer-goods transactions. [[Financial Crimes Enforcement Network\|FinCEN]]'s individual findings discussed Halawi's earlier payments to American used-car companies and Rmeiti's transactions involving Ali Mohamed Kharroubi and Ellissa.<ref name="r39" /><ref name="r40" /><ref name="r41" />

	Treasury placed at least $25 million in Rmeiti payments to car dealers and exporters associated with the network between 2008 and March 2011. These earlier transactions and the alleged later substitution of exchange houses indicate that the department was describing an existing set of financial relationships adapting after disruption, rather than the creation of an entirely new system.<ref name="r39" />		Treasury placed at least $25 million in Rmeiti payments to car dealers and exporters associated with the network between 2008 and March 2011. These earlier transactions and the alleged later substitution of exchange houses indicate that the department was describing an existing set of financial relationships adapting after disruption, rather than the creation of an entirely new system.<ref name="r39" />

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	On 26 January 2011, the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated Joumaa, nine other individuals and 19 entities under the [[Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act\|Kingpin Act]]. The action blocked property under U.S. jurisdiction and prohibited transactions by U.S. persons with the designated parties. Treasury followed in February with its finding that LCB was a financial institution of primary money-laundering concern. Levitt reports that the initial actions also resulted in approximately $700,000 being blocked and about 350 vehicles being held at U.S. ports.<ref name="r2" /><ref name="r5" /><ref name="r9" />		On 26 January 2011, the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated Joumaa, nine other individuals and 19 entities under the [[Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act\|Kingpin Act]]. The action blocked property under U.S. jurisdiction and prohibited transactions by U.S. persons with the designated parties. Treasury followed in February with its finding that LCB was a financial institution of primary money-laundering concern. Levitt reports that the initial actions also resulted in approximately $700,000 being blocked and about 350 vehicles being held at U.S. ports.<ref name="r2" /><ref name="r5" /><ref name="r9" />

	The criminal and civil proceedings followed later in the year. The Virginia grand jury returned the indictment against Joumaa on 23 November; the charges were announced in December. On 15 December, the United States filed its ~~civil~~ forfeiture and money-laundering case concerning LCB and associated entities. The criminal charges addressed Joumaa's alleged trafficking and laundering conduct, while the civil case pursued assets connected to the broader financial scheme.<ref name="r1" /><ref name="r10" />		The criminal and civil proceedings followed later in the year. The Virginia grand jury returned the indictment against Joumaa on 23 November; the charges were announced in December. On 15 December, the United States filed its [[Civil forfeiture]] and money-laundering case concerning LCB and associated entities. The criminal charges addressed Joumaa's alleged trafficking and laundering conduct, while the civil case pursued assets connected to the broader financial scheme.<ref name="r1" /><ref name="r10" />

	Asher and Maltz subsequently described the response as a combination of sanctions, bank restrictions, civil forfeiture and criminal investigation. Their accounts emphasize targeting the network at several points: the alleged traffickers, the exchange houses, the bank and the businesses handling merchandise. This combination made the case an example in later policy debates over the use of financial restrictions alongside prosecution.<ref name="r36" /><ref name="r37" /><ref name="r38" />		Asher and Maltz subsequently described the response as a combination of sanctions, bank restrictions, civil forfeiture and criminal investigation. Their accounts emphasize targeting the network at several points: the alleged traffickers, the exchange houses, the bank and the businesses handling merchandise. This combination made the case an example in later policy debates over the use of financial restrictions alongside prosecution.<ref name="r36" /><ref name="r37" /><ref name="r38" />

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	Treasury's February 2011 [[Lebanese Canadian Bank\|LCB]] announcement stated that [[Hezbollah]] derived financial support from Joumaa's network. The later civil complaint described a specific alleged mechanism: the organization paid Hezbollah to facilitate the transport and laundering of narcotics proceeds, including safeguarding bulk cash arriving at Beirut International Airport and taking it to its recipient. UNICRI's subsequent account likewise describes money couriers and airport security as elements of the return route to Lebanon. The benefit assessment did not identify Hezbollah as the recipient of every payment or every participant as a Hezbollah member.<ref name="r5" /><ref name="r6" /><ref name="r16" />		Treasury's February 2011 [[Lebanese Canadian Bank\|LCB]] announcement stated that [[Hezbollah]] derived financial support from Joumaa's network. The later civil complaint described a specific alleged mechanism: the organization paid Hezbollah to facilitate the transport and laundering of narcotics proceeds, including safeguarding bulk cash arriving at Beirut International Airport and taking it to its recipient. UNICRI's subsequent account likewise describes money couriers and airport security as elements of the return route to Lebanon. The benefit assessment did not identify Hezbollah as the recipient of every payment or every participant as a Hezbollah member.<ref name="r5" /><ref name="r6" /><ref name="r16" />

	Other allegations concerned the institutions around Joumaa. Treasury described relationships between LCB managers and Hezbollah officials, including Abdallah Safieddine's role in facilitating Iranian officials' access to the bank. In a June 2012 action, the department alleged that [[Abbas Hussein Harb]]'s Colombia- and Venezuela-based organization laundered money for Joumaa through Lebanon's financial sector. It identified [[Ibrahim Chibli]], manager of Fenicia Bank's Abbassieh branch, as a facilitator and cited a transfer of more than $1 million in 2010 into a Harb-owned account managed by Chibli.<ref name="r5" /><ref name="r21" />		Other allegations concerned the institutions around Joumaa. Treasury described relationships between LCB managers and Hezbollah officials, including [[Abdallah Safieddine]]'s role in facilitating Iranian officials' access to the bank. In a June 2012 action, the department alleged that [[Abbas Hussein Harb]]'s Colombia- and Venezuela-based organization laundered money for Joumaa through Lebanon's financial sector. It identified [[Ibrahim Chibli]], manager of Fenicia Bank's Abbassieh branch, as a facilitator and cited a transfer of more than $1 million in 2010 into a Harb-owned account managed by Chibli.<ref name="r5" /><ref name="r21" />

	The same action separately designated [[Ali Mohamad Saleh]] for supporting Hezbollah. Treasury described Saleh as a former fighter who directed a fundraising cell in Maicao and coordinated transfers through Venezuela to Lebanon. His earlier narcotics designation concerned laundering for the Cheaitelly/El Khansa organization, which Treasury linked to Joumaa's network. InSight Crime's coverage and Levitt's later testimony trace these connected but distinct organizational roles.<ref name="r21" /><ref name="r22" /><ref name="r23" />		The same action separately designated [[Ali Mohamad Saleh]] for supporting Hezbollah. Treasury described Saleh as a former fighter who directed a fundraising cell in Maicao and coordinated transfers through Venezuela to Lebanon. His earlier narcotics designation concerned laundering for the Cheaitelly/El Khansa organization, which Treasury linked to Joumaa's network. InSight Crime's coverage and Levitt's later testimony trace these connected but distinct organizational roles.<ref name="r21" /><ref name="r22" /><ref name="r23" />

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	== Asian goods and settlement in Latin America ==		== Asian goods and settlement in Latin America ==

	FinCEN described a second commercial route involving Asian consumer goods. Funds passed through [[Lebanese Canadian Bank\|LCB]]'s U.S. correspondent accounts to Asian suppliers; the goods were shipped to Latin America and sold. The proceeds then entered a [[Black Market Peso Exchange]] arrangement, a system for settling drug proceeds through currency brokerage and commercial transactions.<ref name="r4" />		[[Financial Crimes Enforcement Network\|FinCEN]] described a second commercial route involving Asian consumer goods. Funds passed through [[Lebanese Canadian Bank\|LCB]]'s U.S. correspondent accounts to Asian suppliers; the goods were shipped to Latin America and sold. The proceeds then entered a [[Black Market Peso Exchange]] arrangement, a system for settling drug proceeds through currency brokerage and commercial transactions.<ref name="r4" />

	A later FDD study describes commodities purchased for Latin American fronts, sold through retail businesses in Colombia and Venezuela, and used to return proceeds to cartel customers after commission. In this account, the movement of merchandise supplied a commercial explanation for international payments while providing value to customers in another market.<ref name="r11" />		A later FDD study describes commodities purchased for Latin American fronts, sold through retail businesses in Colombia and Venezuela, and used to return proceeds to cartel customers after commission. In this account, the movement of merchandise supplied a commercial explanation for international payments while providing value to customers in another market.<ref name="r11" />

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	[[Financial Crimes Enforcement Network\|FinCEN]] described Joumaa's alleged laundering system as beginning with bulk cash and exchange-house deposits. Currency was deposited with Lebanese exchange businesses, which placed funds in accounts at [[Lebanese Canadian Bank\|LCB]]. Joumaa or the exchange houses then instructed the bank to make international transfers. Correspondent accounts—accounts banks maintain with other banks to process payments—provided access to the U.S. financial system.<ref name="r4" />		[[Financial Crimes Enforcement Network\|FinCEN]] described Joumaa's alleged laundering system as beginning with bulk cash and exchange-house deposits. Currency was deposited with Lebanese exchange businesses, which placed funds in accounts at [[Lebanese Canadian Bank\|LCB]]. Joumaa or the exchange houses then instructed the bank to make international transfers. Correspondent accounts—accounts banks maintain with other banks to process payments—provided access to the U.S. financial system.<ref name="r4" />

	Treasury identified [[Hassan Ayash Exchange Company]], [[Ellissa Exchange Company]] and New Line Exchange Trust as businesses allegedly used by the organization. These intermediaries connected cash-based activity to bank transfers and commercial payments. The resulting trade-based laundering arrangements used purchases and resale of merchandise to move value between countries.<ref name="r2" /><ref name="r4" />		Treasury identified [[Hassan Ayash Exchange Company]], [[Ellissa Exchange Company]] and [[New Line Exchange Trust]] as businesses allegedly used by the organization. These intermediaries connected cash-based activity to bank transfers and commercial payments. The resulting trade-based laundering arrangements used purchases and resale of merchandise to move value between countries.<ref name="r2" /><ref name="r4" />

	Treasury estimated in January 2011 that the organization laundered as much as $200 million a month through bulk cash, exchange houses and commercial businesses. This was an agency estimate of network activity, rather than a measure of Joumaa's personal earnings or the amount received by [[Hezbollah]].<ref name="r2" />		Treasury estimated in January 2011 that the organization laundered as much as $200 million a month through bulk cash, exchange houses and commercial businesses. This was an agency estimate of network activity, rather than a measure of Joumaa's personal earnings or the amount received by [[Hezbollah]].<ref name="r2" />

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	== Money-laundering methods ==		== Money-laundering methods ==

	FinCEN described Joumaa's alleged laundering system as beginning with bulk cash and exchange-house deposits. Currency was deposited with Lebanese exchange businesses, which placed funds in accounts at [[Lebanese Canadian Bank\|LCB]]. Joumaa or the exchange houses then instructed the bank to make international transfers. Correspondent accounts—accounts banks maintain with other banks to process payments—provided access to the U.S. financial system.<ref name="r4" />		[[Financial Crimes Enforcement Network\|FinCEN]] described Joumaa's alleged laundering system as beginning with bulk cash and exchange-house deposits. Currency was deposited with Lebanese exchange businesses, which placed funds in accounts at [[Lebanese Canadian Bank\|LCB]]. Joumaa or the exchange houses then instructed the bank to make international transfers. Correspondent accounts—accounts banks maintain with other banks to process payments—provided access to the U.S. financial system.<ref name="r4" />

	Treasury identified [[Hassan Ayash Exchange Company]], [[Ellissa Exchange Company]] and New Line Exchange Trust as businesses allegedly used by the organization. These intermediaries connected cash-based activity to bank transfers and commercial payments. The resulting trade-based laundering arrangements used purchases and resale of merchandise to move value between countries.<ref name="r2" /><ref name="r4" />		Treasury identified [[Hassan Ayash Exchange Company]], [[Ellissa Exchange Company]] and New Line Exchange Trust as businesses allegedly used by the organization. These intermediaries connected cash-based activity to bank transfers and commercial payments. The resulting trade-based laundering arrangements used purchases and resale of merchandise to move value between countries.<ref name="r2" /><ref name="r4" />

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	'''Ayman Saied Joumaa''', also known as Junior, is a Lebanese-born businessman accused by United States authorities of directing an international cocaine-trafficking and money-laundering network. In January 2011, the U.S. Treasury Department designated him under the [[Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act]]. A federal grand jury in Virginia indicted him that November on cocaine-distribution and money-laundering conspiracy charges. The allegations concerned a network operating across Latin America, West Africa and Lebanon, with financial and commercial connections to the United States, Europe and Asia.<ref name="r1" /><ref name="r2" /><ref name="r3" />		'''Ayman Saied Joumaa''', also known as Junior, is a Lebanese-born businessman accused by United States authorities of directing an international cocaine-trafficking and money-laundering network. In January 2011, the U.S. Treasury Department designated him under the [[Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act]]. A federal grand jury in Virginia indicted him that November on cocaine-distribution and money-laundering conspiracy charges. The allegations concerned a network operating across Latin America, West Africa and Lebanon, with financial and commercial connections to the United States, Europe and Asia.<ref name="r1" /><ref name="r2" /><ref name="r3" />

	The network's alleged importance lay in combining drug shipments with the collection and settlement of their proceeds. Prosecutors described cocaine supplied from Colombia to Mexico's [[Los Zetas in the Ayman Joumaa case\|Los Zetas]] cartel and a financial service that returned money to suppliers in Colombia and Venezuela. Treasury and the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) described exchange houses, bank accounts, used-car businesses and consumer-goods trading companies as parts of the system.<ref name="r4" /><ref name="r1" />		The network's alleged importance lay in combining drug shipments with the collection and settlement of their proceeds. Prosecutors described cocaine supplied from Colombia to Mexico's [[Los Zetas in the Ayman Joumaa case\|Los Zetas]] cartel and a financial service that returned money to suppliers in Colombia and Venezuela. Treasury and the [[Financial Crimes Enforcement Network]] (FinCEN) described exchange houses, bank accounts, used-car businesses and consumer-goods trading companies as parts of the system.<ref name="r4" /><ref name="r1" />

	U.S. authorities also alleged that [[Hezbollah]] benefited from the network's activities. The allegations included payments for courier and cash-protection services, as well as relationships involving named financial intermediaries. Researchers have differed over whether these relationships demonstrate organizational direction by Hezbollah or cooperation through commercially motivated facilitators. Related proceedings resulted in a $102 million forfeiture by [[Lebanese Canadian Bank]] (LCB), while Joumaa separately pursued an unsuccessful challenge to his sanctions designation in 2019 and on appeal in March 2020. Joumaa denied illicit activity; the courts upheld the sanctions decision without adjudicating the separate criminal charges.<ref name="r5" /><ref name="r6" /><ref name="r7" /><ref name="r8" /><ref name="r9" /><ref name="r10" /><ref name="r11" /><ref name="r48" /><ref name="r47" />		U.S. authorities also alleged that [[Hezbollah]] benefited from the network's activities. The allegations included payments for courier and cash-protection services, as well as relationships involving named financial intermediaries. Researchers have differed over whether these relationships demonstrate organizational direction by Hezbollah or cooperation through commercially motivated facilitators. Related proceedings resulted in a $102 million forfeiture by [[Lebanese Canadian Bank]] (LCB), while Joumaa separately pursued an unsuccessful challenge to his sanctions designation in 2019 and on appeal in March 2020. Joumaa denied illicit activity; the courts upheld the sanctions decision without adjudicating the separate criminal charges.<ref name="r5" /><ref name="r6" /><ref name="r7" /><ref name="r8" /><ref name="r9" /><ref name="r10" /><ref name="r11" /><ref name="r48" /><ref name="r47" />

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	''Legal and sanctions status as of 5 October 2026.''		''Legal and sanctions status as of 5 October 2026.''

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	In July 2014, Treasury described Pedro Claver Mejia Salazar as a launderer for [[La Oficina de Envigado]] who worked closely with Joumaa under the direction of a La Oficina underboss. According to the agency, La Oficina operatives used Joumaa's international channels to return proceeds to Colombian traffickers. Mejia subsequently had his own criminal outcome in Boston, reported by the Justice Department in September 2017. His proceeding was separate from Joumaa's: a plea by one intermediary did not determine the responsibility of other people named in sanctions announcements.<ref name="r51" /><ref name="r52" />		In July 2014, Treasury described Pedro Claver Mejia Salazar as a launderer for [[La Oficina de Envigado]] who worked closely with Joumaa under the direction of a La Oficina underboss. According to the agency, La Oficina operatives used Joumaa's international channels to return proceeds to Colombian traffickers. Mejia subsequently had his own criminal outcome in Boston, reported by the Justice Department in September 2017. His proceeding was separate from Joumaa's: a plea by one intermediary did not determine the responsibility of other people named in sanctions announcements.<ref name="r51" /><ref name="r52" />

			== References ==
			<references>
			<ref name="r1">[https://www.dea.gov/press-releases/2011/12/13/us-charges-alleged-lebanese-drug-kingpin-laundering-drug-proceeds-mexican U.S. Charges Alleged Lebanese Drug Kingpin With Laundering Drug Proceeds For Mexican And Colombian Drug Cartels]</ref>
			<ref name="r2">[https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/tg1035 Treasury Targets Major Lebanese-Based Drug Trafficking and Money Laundering Network \| U.S. Department of the Treasury]</ref>
			<ref name="r3">[https://esdegue.edu.co/es/ayman-saied Ayman Saied \| Escuela Superior de Guerra]</ref>
			<ref name="r4">[https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2011/02/17/2011-3346/finding-that-the-lebanese-canadian-bank-sal-is-a-financial-institution-of-primary-money-laundering Federal Register :: Finding That the Lebanese Canadian Bank SAL Is a Financial Institution of Primary Money Laundering Concern]</ref>
			<ref name="r5">[https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/tg1057 Treasury Identifies Lebanese Canadian Bank Sal as a “Primary Money Laundering Concern” \| U.S. Department of the Treasury]</ref>
			<ref name="r6">[https://www.justice.gov/usao/nys/pressreleases/June13/LCBSettlementPR/U.S.%20v.%20Lebanese%20Canadian%20Bank%2C%20et%20al.%20Amended%20Complaint.pdf VERIFIED AMENDED COMPLAINT — 11 Civ. 9186 (PAE)]</ref>
			<ref name="r7">[https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/perspectives/PEA3500/PEA3585-1/RAND_PEA3585-1.pdf Hezbollah's Networks in Latin America: Potential Implications for U.S. Policy and Research]</ref>
			<ref name="r8">[https://insightcrime.org/news/analysis/hezbollah-in-latin-america-an-over-hyped-threat/ Hezbollah in Latin America: An Over-Hyped Threat?]</ref>
			<ref name="r9">[https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/sites/default/files/pdf/Levitt-20180320-Lawfare.pdf Matthew Levitt — In Search of Nuance in the Debate over Hezbollah's Criminal Enterprise and the U.S. Response]</ref>
			<ref name="r10">[https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/manhattan-us-attorney-announces-102-million-settlement-civil-forfeiture-and-money Southern District of New York \| Manhattan U.S. Attorney Announces $102 Million Settlement Of Civil Forfeiture And Money Laundering Claims Against Lebanese Canadian Bank \| United States Department of Justice]</ref>
			<ref name="r11">[https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2020/09/23/hezbollah-finance-in-lebanon/ Hezbollah Finance in Lebanon]</ref>
			<ref name="r48">[https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCOURTS-dcd-1_17-cv-02780/pdf/USCOURTS-dcd-1_17-cv-02780-0.pdf Joumaa v. Mnuchin, D.D.C., memorandum opinion, 10 April 2019]</ref>
			<ref name="r47">[https://media.cadc.uscourts.gov/judgments/docs/2020/03/19-5166-1831373.pdf Joumaa v. Mnuchin, D.C. Circuit, No. 19-5166, judgment, 3 March 2020]</ref>
			<ref name="r12">[https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en/c/iran/page/154/ Latin America as a Terrorist, Subversive, Criminal Arena for Iran and Hezbollah]</ref>
			<ref name="r13">[https://smallwarsjournal.com/2023/04/26/hezbollahs-global-networks-and-latin-american-cocaine-trade/ Hezbollah’s Global Networks and Latin American Cocaine Trade \| Small Wars Journal by Arizona State University]</ref>
			<ref name="r14">[https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/The-Maduro-Hezbollah-Nexus-How-Iran-backed-Networks-Prop-up-the-Venezuelan-Regime.pdf The Maduro–Hezbollah Nexus]</ref>
			<ref name="r15">[https://www.hudson.org/drug-policy/global-gangsters-hezbollahs-latin-american-drug-trafficking-operations-marshall-billingslea Global Gangsters: Hezbollah’s Latin American Drug Trafficking Operations \| Hudson Institute]</ref>
			<ref name="r16">[https://unicri.org/sites/default/files/2024-06/The%20Nexus%20between%20Transnational%20Organized%20Crime%20and%20Terrorism%20in%20Latin%20America.pdf UNICRI — The Nexus between Transnational Organized Crime and Terrorism in Latin America]</ref>
			<ref name="r17">[https://insightcrime.org/news/analysis/terrorist-groups-in-latin-america-the-changing-landscape/ Terrorist Groups in Latin America: The Changing Landscape]</ref>
			<ref name="r18">[https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/sites/default/files/documents/r1x86u-tiqgc/20130111%20R41547.pdf Organized Crime: An Evolving Challenge for U.S. Law Enforcement]</ref>
			<ref name="r19">[https://www.fbi.gov/newyork/press-releases/2011/civil-suit-seeks-more-than-480-million-from-entities-that-facilitated-hizballah-related-money-laundering-scheme FBI — Civil Suit Seeks More Than $480 Million from Entities That Facilitated Hizballah-Related Money Laundering Scheme]</ref>
			<ref name="r20">[https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GOVPUB-D5-PURL-gpo76875/pdf/GOVPUB-D5-PURL-gpo76875.pdf Beyond Covergence: World Without Order]</ref>
			<ref name="r21">[https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/tg1624 Treasury Targets Major Money Laundering Network Linked to Drug Trafficker Ayman Joumaa and a Key Hizballah Supporter in South America \| U.S. Department of the Treasury]</ref>
			<ref name="r22">[https://insightcrime.org/news/brief/us-treasury-points-to-hezbollah-presence-in-latam/ US Treasury Points to Hezbollah Presence in LatAm]</ref>
			<ref name="r23">[https://www.drugcaucus.senate.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Levitt-Senate-CINC-LH-drug-trafficking-10-21-25-FINAL-1.pdf Matthew Levitt — Senate testimony, October 2025]</ref>
			<ref name="r24">[https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2015/05/21/a-dangerous-nexus-terrorism-crime-and-corruption/ A Dangerous Nexus: Terrorism, Crime, and Corruption]</ref>
			<ref name="r25">[https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2017/10/04/time-to-designate-hezbollah-as-a-transnational-criminal-organization/ Time to Designate Hezbollah as a Transnational Criminal Organization]</ref>
			<ref name="r26">[https://insightcrime.org/news/brief/us-alleges-zetas-hezbollah-funding-link/ US Alleges Zetas-Hezbollah Funding Link]</ref>
			<ref name="r27">[https://insightcrime.org/news/analysis/terrorism-and-crime-in-the-americas-its-business/ Terrorism and Crime in the Americas: 'It's Business']</ref>
			<ref name="r28">[https://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/Humire-Written-Testimony.pdf Joseph Humire — March 2025 written testimony]</ref>
			<ref name="r29">[https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2025/04/hezbollahs-network-on-americas-southern-doorstep.html Hezbollah's Network on America's Southern Doorstep \| RAND]</ref>
			<ref name="r53">[https://www.inss.org.il/wp-content/uploads/systemfiles/MASA5-2Eng6_KronenfeldGuzansky.pdf Sami Kronenfeld and Yoel Guzansky, The Revolutionary Guards and the International Drug Trade, Military and Strategic Affairs 5(2), September 2013]</ref>
			<ref name="r30">[https://2009-2017.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2013/vol1/204045.htm 2013 INCSR — U.S. Government Assistance]</ref>
			<ref name="r31">[https://financialservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/hhrg-114-ba00-wstate-mbraun-20160608.pdf Michael Braun — June 2016 written testimony]</ref>
			<ref name="r32">[https://www.inss.org.il/private/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2020/01/the-deas-targeting-of-hezbollahs-global-criminal-support-network-en.pdf The DEA’s Targeting of Hezbollah’s Global Criminal Support Network]</ref>
			<ref name="r33">[https://pt.icct.nl/sites/default/files/import/pdf/hezbollah%E2%80%99s-organized-criminal-enterprises-in-europe--matthew-levitt.pdf Matthew Levitt — Hezbollah's Organized Criminal Enterprises in Europe]</ref>
			<ref name="r34">[https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-115hhrg31416/html/CHRG-115hhrg31416.htm - EXPLORING THE FINANCIAL NEXUS OF TERRORISM, DRUG TRAFFICKING, AND ORGANIZED CRIME]</ref>
			<ref name="r35">[https://ctc.westpoint.edu/attacking-drug-cartels-through-undercover-money-laundering-operations/ Attacking Drug Cartels Through Undercover Money Laundering Operations - Combating Terrorism Center at West Point]</ref>
			<ref name="r36">[https://s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/defenddemocracy/uploads/documents/60817_Asher_Testimony.PDF David Asher — June 2017 written testimony]</ref>
			<ref name="r37">[http://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA00/20170608/106094/HHRG-115-FA00-Wstate-MaltzD-20170608.pdf "Attacking Hezbollah's Financial Network: Policy Options" JUNE 8, 2017 STATEMENT OF DEREK S. MALTZ INTRODUCTION]</ref>
			<ref name="r38">[https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2017/11/08/examining-the-effectiveness-of-the-kingpin-designation-act-in-the-western-hemisphere/ Examining the Effectiveness of the Kingpin Designation Act in the Western Hemisphere]</ref>
			<ref name="r39">[https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jl1908 Treasury Identifies Kassem Rmeiti & Co. for Exchange and Halawi Exchange Co. as Financial Institutions of “Primary Money Laundering Concern” \| U.S. Department of the Treasury]</ref>
			<ref name="r40">[https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2013/04/25/2013-09785/notice-of-finding-that-halawi-exchange-co-is-a-financial-institution-of-primary-money-laundering Federal Register :: Notice of Finding That Halawi Exchange Co. Is a Financial Institution of Primary Money Laundering Concern]</ref>
			<ref name="r41">[https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2013/04/25/2013-09783/notice-of-finding-that-kassem-rmeiti-and-co-for-exchange-is-a-financial-institution-of-primary-money Federal Register :: Notice of Finding That Kassem Rmeiti & Co. For Exchange Is a Financial Institution of Primary Money Laundering Concern]</ref>
			<ref name="r50">[https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jl0196 Treasury maritime-network action, 1 October 2015]</ref>
			<ref name="r49">[https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20170509 OFAC removals, 9 May 2017]</ref>
			<ref name="r42">[https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm0388 Treasury Targets Key Hizballah Financing Network and Iranian Conduit \| U.S. Department of the Treasury]</ref>
			<ref name="r43">[https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm650 Treasury Sanctions Lebanese Money Launderer Kassem Chams Who Moves Money on Behalf of Narcotics Trafficking Organizations and Hizballah \| U.S. Department of the Treasury]</ref>
			<ref name="r44">[https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2019/04/12/treasury-sanctions-against-lebanese-exchange-house-shows-narco-terror-convergence/ Treasury Sanctions Against Lebanese Exchange House Shows Narco-terror Convergence]</ref>
			<ref name="r45">[https://besacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/194web.pdf The Laundromat: Hezbollah's Money-Laundering and Drug-Trafficking Networks in Latin America]</ref>
			<ref name="r46">[https://www.counterextremism.com/sites/default/files/2025-10/KAS-CEP_Hezbollah-Wagner_Oct%2025%20final.pdf External Non-State Actors as a Source of Instability in West Africa: Hezbollah and Wagner/Africa Corps]</ref>
			<ref name="r51">[https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jl250 Treasury, Mejia Salazar network and La Oficina, 1 July 2014]</ref>
			<ref name="r52">[https://www.justice.gov/usao-ma/pr/colombian-national-sentenced-international-money-laundering DOJ, Pedro Mejia Salazar sentenced, 6 September 2017]</ref>
			</references>

			''Legal and sanctions status as of 5 October 2026.''

			[[Category:People]]
			[[Category:Ayman Joumaa case]]