View source for Ghazi Nasr al-Din

[[File:Ghazi Nasr al-Din.jpg|thumb|upright=1.25|alt=Ghazi Nasr Al-Din|Illustration for the entry Ghazi Nasr al-Din. Photo: Federal Bureau of Investigation ([https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Ghazi_Nasr_Al-Din.jpg Wikimedia Commons]), [https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Ghazi_Nasr_Al-Din.jpg Public domain].]]

'''Ghazi Nasr al-Din''', also rendered Ghazi Nassereddine and Nasr Al-Din, is a Lebanese-born Venezuelan diplomat described in U.S. sanctions and research accounts as a [[Hezbollah]] fundraiser and facilitator. His reported activities concern donor contacts, travel arrangements and access between Venezuelan and Middle Eastern officials. Treasury designated him in June 2008. In January 2015, the FBI sought information about his alleged fundraising activities; that information request was distinct from the agency’s contemporaneous addition of another person to its Most Wanted Terrorists list.<ref name="r1" /><ref name="r2" /><ref name="r3" />

== Diplomatic and community positions ==

The Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center’s account describes Nasr al-Din as having served as chargé d’affaires at Venezuela’s embassy in Damascus and subsequently in a political-affairs position at its embassy in Beirut. It also identifies him as president of a Shiite Islamic center in Caracas. These positions mattered to the allegations because they could provide access to political officials, prospective donors and travel arrangements. The allegation concerns how he used those positions; it does not establish that all staff or members of the institutions participated in illicit activity.<ref name="r1" />

== Fundraising and travel facilitation ==

The account of Treasury’s June 2008 action says Nasr al-Din advised [[Hezbollah]] donors and gave them details of bank accounts into which contributions could be deposited. It also describes his assistance with the movement of Hezbollah operatives to and from Venezuela. The alleged role was therefore more specific than sympathy for the organization: he was said to connect donors and travelers to practical channels. No aggregate figure for money raised by him is supplied in these passages.<ref name="r1" />

ITIC’s report describes a January 2006 visit by two Hezbollah members of the Lebanese parliament, arranged for fundraising and the opening of a Hezbollah-supported community center in Venezuela. It also reports that Nasr al-Din arranged travel to Iran for training in the preceding year. These dated allegations describe different functions—fundraising, public-facing institutional activity and travel facilitation—and should not be collapsed into a claim that each journey was a narcotics operation.<ref name="r1" />

== Sanctions and the FBI request ==

The June 2008 action also targeted Fawzi Kan’an and his travel business. The presence of both men in the same sanctions announcement does not make their companies or actions identical. Nasr al-Din’s specific alleged contribution was tied to his diplomatic and community roles. In 2015, the FBI asked for information concerning his fundraising for [[Hezbollah]]. The FBI page’s headline and main narrative concerned Liban Haji Mohamed, who was added to the Most Wanted Terrorists list; its Nasr al-Din passage was a separate request for information.<ref name="r1" /><ref name="r2" />

== The alleged 2009 meeting ==

The May 2020 complaint against [[Adel El Zabayar]] describes a meeting in Syria involving Nasr al-Din, [[Tareck El Aissami]], [[Hugo Armando Carvajal Barrios|Hugo Carvajal]] and a [[Hezbollah]] operative. It recounts a proposal for Hezbollah personnel to travel to Venezuela and work with FARC, along with gifts of rifles. The complaint’s footnote says Carvajal later claimed to have objected to inviting Hezbollah. The meeting account establishes what the complaint alleged; it is not a judgment that every proposed activity occurred or that Nasr al-Din controlled the later conduct attributed to other defendants.<ref name="r4" />

== Facilitation networks ==

Joseph Humire’s 2020 Atlantic Council study discusses Nasr al-Din within a wider family network and characterizes the family’s role as that of facilitators connecting [[Hezbollah]]-associated actors with Venezuelan officials. It distinguishes these facilitators from members of Hezbollah’s formal hierarchical command. That is the author’s interpretation, supported in the report by interviews and other records. Conduct attributed to relatives should remain attached to the named relative; the family label is not a substitute for identifying Nasr al-Din’s own role.<ref name="r3" />

== Regional setting ==

INSS’s study of Iran in Latin America describes Venezuela as a central location for Iranian diplomatic and military engagement. Nasr al-Din’s reported diplomatic posts help explain why he appears in discussions of these connections, alongside accounts of fundraising and travel. Regional cooperation, a diplomat’s alleged facilitation and a particular criminal transaction are different subjects. The entry’s financial claims concern the donor and transfer channels attributed to him, rather than an assumed share of all Venezuelan narcotics revenue.<ref name="r5" /><ref name="r1" />

== References ==
<references>
<ref name="r1">[https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en/18291/ Iran increases its political and economic presence in Latin America]</ref>
<ref name="r2">[https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/new-most-wanted-terrorist FBI, New Most Wanted Terrorist, January 29, 2015: separate Ghazi Nasr Al-Din information request]</ref>
<ref name="r3">[https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/the-maduro-hezbollah-nexus-how-iran-backed-networks-prop-up-the-venezuelan-regime/ The Maduro-Hezbollah Nexus: How Iran-backed Networks Prop up the Venezuelan Regime]</ref>
<ref name="r4">[https://www.justice.gov/d9/press-releases/attachments/2020/05/27/adel_el_zabayar_complaint_20_mag_5469.pdf United States v. Adel El Zabayar, complaint, May 2020, page 10 (inherited full text)]</ref>
<ref name="r5">[https://www.inss.org.il/publication/iran-south-america/ Iran in Latin America]</ref>
</references>

''Legal and sanctions status as of 5 September 2026.''

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